Uploading consciousness into a computer

  On 3/29/2012 at 1:18 PM, ZoeB said:

  On 3/29/2012 at 12:57 PM, Adam Beker said:

We need to invent few new words for this.

 

You say that they both be equally you. That's correct fromt third person perspective. But, at the moment there's only one Zoe. You are feeling it from first person perspective. When someone copies your brain, Zoe B appears. You can see her from third person perspective, but from first person perspective you will be the "original" Zoe. I hope you understand what I mean here by saying "you".

 

Right, and from her perspective, she will be the "original" Zoë and will feel herself from the first person perspective just as much as I do myself. From her perspective, I'll be the other person.

 

I'll become two separate people. As Zoë A, I'll experience being Zoë A and see Zoë B as just another person, like a twin with a shared history. And as Zoë B, I'll experience being Zoë B and see Zoë A as just another person. They'll both experience being themselves in the first person, and meeting their other self in the second and third person.

Zoë B discovers time travel and goes back to clone herself.

ah, but what about the fourth person?

*strokes beard*

  On 3/29/2012 at 1:23 PM, Gary C said:

Zoë B discovers time travel and goes back to clone herself.

There is another theory which states that this has already happened.

  On 3/29/2012 at 1:18 PM, ZoeB said:

  On 3/29/2012 at 12:57 PM, Adam Beker said:

We need to invent few new words for this.

 

You say that they both be equally you. That's correct fromt third person perspective. But, at the moment there's only one Zoe. You are feeling it from first person perspective. When someone copies your brain, Zoe B appears. You can see her from third person perspective, but from first person perspective you will be the "original" Zoe. I hope you understand what I mean here by saying "you".

 

Right, and from her perspective, she will be the "original" Zoë and will feel herself from the first person perspective just as much as I do myself. From her perspective, I'll be the other person.

 

I'll become two separate people. As Zoë A, I'll experience being Zoë A and see Zoë B as just another person, like a twin with a shared history. And as Zoë B, I'll experience being Zoë B and see Zoë A as just another person. They'll both experience being themselves in the first person, and meeting their other self in the second and third person.

Yes, and you won't care about Zoe B because she'll be another person with same memories and shit. You care about yourself - Zoe A. That's why there's difference between which one will you end up being, as in destructive case of consiousness upload Zoe A dies therefore YOU DIE AND YOUR CLONE LIVES THATS DIFFERENT!!

sorry

Have you seen The Prestige? The most enthralling aspect occurs in the last 15 minutes and it's exactly this argument, but acted out visually.

  On 3/29/2012 at 2:02 PM, Adam Beker said:

Yes, and you won't care about Zoe B because she'll be another person with same memories and shit. You care about yourself - Zoe A. That's why there's difference between which one will you end up being, as in destructive case of consiousness upload Zoe A dies therefore YOU DIE AND YOUR CLONE LIVES THATS DIFFERENT!!

As Zoë A, I'll care more about her, sure, and as Zoë B, I'll care more about her. It wouldn't make a scrap of difference if one of them died at the point of forking, as you'd still just be one person with a single, linear narrative. As Zoë B, the simulation, I wouldn't care too much about Zoë A dying as at least I would have survived. Of course, I'd rather we both lived, I'm not a psychopath, although it could get awkward bumping into each other at parties...

You may also be interested in one of the stories I've written about just this kind of scenario.

You can't care more about Zoe B as Zoe B because you're not Zoe B. You're Zoe A. And if someone copied you (Zoe A, the current you that is reading this) without you knowing it and killed you, you say there would be no difference to you if you or your copy was killed? that's nonsense.

  On 3/29/2012 at 2:18 PM, ZoeB said:

You may also be interested in one of the stories I've written about just this kind of scenario.

read it, not bad...could use a bit of editing

Lordy, I've ended up having a discussion about this with my partner over our lunch break now... it turns out she'd be happy with the jewel from Greg Egan's short story Learning to Be Me, but she wouldn't be willing to use the Star Trek transporter as it would kill her...

Maybe I'm more of a pragmatist than an idealist in this regard? I don't see either the "original" or "copied" version of me being more valid than the other one. Both remember being the old me, and they have equal claims to being the "real" me. If you get your brain backed up, then you're hit by a car and die, and the backed up version of you takes your place, I for one wouldn't care. From the point of view of me now, I wouldn't care. From the point of view of being the copy, I wouldn't really care. And from the point of view of being someone realising she's about to die, if I know that someone who shares all my exact memories up until a few minutes ago, the brain state I had then, my exact chemical imbalances of that point and so on, is going to take my place, I really won't care too much that my stream of consciousness will end, to be replaced with another just like it. It just wouldn't be that important to me. I would like at least one of me to live, but I wouldn't care too much if it was me me or another me. The more recent the last backup or fork, the less I'd worry about dying.

From my point of view, this arugment is kind of like someone seeing a fork in the road, and asking which is the real road, the left or right path.

I think that's all I wanted to say on the subject, really. I'll see you all on the planet's surface, once that ship eventually takes you here the scenic route.

  On 3/29/2012 at 10:46 AM, ZoeB said:

  On 3/28/2012 at 10:18 PM, Joseph said:

I have already acknowledged that this is correct. Please try to understand what I am actually saying.

 

I am not talking about an identity problem, I am talking about an experiential problem. Re-examine my journal question. If you keep a journal before, during, and after a copy of you is made, there will be a point in time where the contents of the two journals begin to differ, based on the differing experiences of the different copies. You cannot both consciousnesses at the same time. Each copy will have equal claim to be "you", but there will be two distinct journals corresponding to two distinct conscious people.

 

You can't experience both. You can't experience neither, because by hypothesis we have already assumed that such a digital copy is possible. It is impossible to predict which one you will experience being, even though from a 3rd-person perspective both are equally "you", and of course the 1st-person experience of the other copy will have equal "legitimacy".

 

It's a nonsensical question. It would only make sense if there could only be one true "you", observing everything from an outsider's perspective, using a body as a vessel, ie a soul, but that's not true. Both lifeforms would have the first person point of view of being you, because they both have your brain. You put it well in this other post:

You're still ignoring my question. Are you going to even think about the journal?

  On 3/29/2012 at 10:46 AM, ZoeB said:

You have no qualms about whether you of one second ago or current you is the "real" one. If two copies of you existed simultaneously, that wouldn't change this. Each person identifies herself as conscious and as being that one person, these two just happen to share memories up until a point.

 

So if I get myself backed up, and walk out of there, and think of myself as Zoë branch A, and the virtual version of me wakes up and thinks of herself as Zoë branch B, we've still both been the exact same person until that point, and it's only our new, differing stimuli and (simulated or not) chemical imbalances that make us different. From Zoë A's point of view, she's had a linear progression without interruption, and Zoë B can claim the same.

 

So yes, I can predict I would be both people. Why would that seem impossible to you? Both, from their first person point of view, would clearly remember being me, and have uninterrupted, sequential steps from being me to being them.

That is absolutely correct, as I have said 2 or 3 times already. Are you even reading my posts?

Let me be more explicit. Suppose you are in your living room and you are copied, and the copy appears in the kitchen. Before the copying occurs, can you predict where you will be at the moment of the duplication? Will your journal say "I am in the kitchen" or "I am in the living room"? Don't respond "there will be two journals with equally valid statements". I know that already. I am asking about your first person experience.

  On 3/29/2012 at 11:41 AM, Adam Beker said:

  On 3/28/2012 at 11:17 PM, Joseph said:

It does contradict 1st person determinism, yes. I don't see how determinism is needed for the upload, except for the fact that we need classical physics (for all practical purposes) in order to make the perfect copy (only in principle of course). But that's not related to the first person indeterminism.

 

Isn't determinism needed for anything to actually work lol?

No...we already live in a non-deterministic quantum mechanical world.

  On 3/29/2012 at 11:41 AM, Adam Beker said:

If determinism is false the upload is impossible because there's no way to understand if it's an upload or copy-paste-delete. I mean consciousnes upload. If you say it's unpredictable then you introduce magic don't you?

I'm not sure what you mean by this, could you explain a bit? Keep in mind that this nondeterminism is a first-person nondeterminism, not third-person.

Don't take what I say too seriously, I'm just thinking out loudly. I did't understand what you meant by saying "It is clearly unpredictable in principle", you mean it's random? What is 1st person indeterminism and how is it different from any other indeterminism?

  On 3/29/2012 at 5:49 PM, Adam Beker said:

Don't take what I say too seriously, I'm just thinking out loudly. I did't understand what you meant by saying "It is clearly unpredictable in principle", you mean it's random?

I guess you could say that, but there's really nothing random going on (from the 3rd person perspective). See below.

  On 3/29/2012 at 5:49 PM, Adam Beker said:

What is 1st person indeterminism and how is it different from any other indeterminism?

the determinism only makes sense from the viewpoint of the person being duplicated. You cannot predict which duplicate you will be, hence the indeterminism. But people watching this happen see nothing indeterministic. For them there are just 2 Adams instead of 1. Again we see a crucial difference between the 1st and 3rd person viewpoints.

Also, a principle of non-locality arises from this assumption that we can be copied. Consider the case where a duplicate is made 1 million miles away from you. That Adam (which you may or may not experience "being") will have the experience of being wherever you are at one moment, and 1 million miles away the next.

Does this violate relativity? No. From a 3rd person "objective" viewpoint there is no violation of relativity -- nothing exceeded the speed of light, etc. The 1st/3rd distinction appears yet again.

  On 3/28/2012 at 6:33 PM, Joseph said:

  On 3/28/2012 at 12:46 PM, ZoeB said:

  On 3/27/2012 at 4:45 AM, Joseph said:

well, yeah, of course they'll both "be" you from an outsider's perspective. I'm saying which one will you experience being? Can that be predicted?

 

This is a nonsensical question. You'll be forked, and both entities will subjectively experience being "you" and would have equal validity of the claim of being the "real" you.

 

Of course. Both will be subjectively and objectively you. But if you keep a journal starting before the copy is made, and continuing through the duplication and after it, there will now be two journals, one corresponding to each copy. Eventually their contents will change as the copies have different experiences.

 

So to rephrase my question: Can you predict the eventual contents of your journal?

You can't predict the eventual contents of your journal being one entity. The addition of a second entity makes no difference in that scenario.

  On 3/29/2012 at 7:28 PM, chenGOD said:

You can't predict the eventual contents of your journal being one entity. The addition of a second entity makes no difference in that scenario.

I only meant in general, which copy's experiences would go in your journal. Copy 1 or Copy 2

  On 3/29/2012 at 6:48 PM, Joseph said:

  On 3/29/2012 at 5:49 PM, Adam Beker said:

Don't take what I say too seriously, I'm just thinking out loudly. I did't understand what you meant by saying "It is clearly unpredictable in principle", you mean it's random?

 

I guess you could say that, but there's really nothing random going on (from the 3rd person perspective). See below.

 

  On 3/29/2012 at 5:49 PM, Adam Beker said:

What is 1st person indeterminism and how is it different from any other indeterminism?

 

the determinism only makes sense from the viewpoint of the person being duplicated. You cannot predict which duplicate you will be, hence the indeterminism. But people watching this happen see nothing indeterministic. For them there are just 2 Adams instead of 1. Again we see a crucial difference between the 1st and 3rd person viewpoints.

 

 

Also, a principle of non-locality arises from this assumption that we can be copied. Consider the case where a duplicate is made 1 million miles away from you. That Adam (which you may or may not experience "being") will have the experience of being wherever you are at one moment, and 1 million miles away the next.

 

Does this violate relativity? No. From a 3rd person "objective" viewpoint there is no violation of relativity -- nothing exceeded the speed of light, etc. The 1st/3rd distinction appears yet again.

Ah I understand, from 3d person view there's no difference which one you are. But from first person view it clearly is and I still don't understand that if you upload yourself destructively and make two copies. Is it impossible to determine which one you will experience from 1st person view, is it random? If yes then why? What appears most logical to me is that you experience none of them, but again this doesn't seem to favour that the standart upload where you are deconstructed in this world and reconstructed in digital form and you preserve the first person view (or not die in simple words) unless there's some program working in our universe that rejects your consiousness when there are more then one copy of you (sounds like nonsense)

My copy would create a new journal perhaps, although since that is a copy of me presumably with the ability to act as an autonomous agent, I have no way of knowing. My consciousness continues as is. I acknowledge that I have been copied and progress from there. It's not a transference, it is a copy.

To OP : you mean, just like Minecraft ?

Seriously I would, but only if there was some "force quit" option. Just in case I'd got bored.

  On 3/29/2012 at 7:41 PM, Adam Beker said:

  On 3/29/2012 at 6:48 PM, Joseph said:

the determinism only makes sense from the viewpoint of the person being duplicated. You cannot predict which duplicate you will be, hence the indeterminism. But people watching this happen see nothing indeterministic. For them there are just 2 Adams instead of 1. Again we see a crucial difference between the 1st and 3rd person viewpoints.

 

 

Also, a principle of non-locality arises from this assumption that we can be copied. Consider the case where a duplicate is made 1 million miles away from you. That Adam (which you may or may not experience "being") will have the experience of being wherever you are at one moment, and 1 million miles away the next.

 

Does this violate relativity? No. From a 3rd person "objective" viewpoint there is no violation of relativity -- nothing exceeded the speed of light, etc. The 1st/3rd distinction appears yet again.

 

Ah I understand, from 3d person view there's no difference which one you are. But from first person view it clearly is and I still don't understand that if you upload yourself destructively and make two copies. Is it impossible to determine which one you will experience from 1st person view, is it random? If yes then why?

How could it be otherwise? The fact is at the end of the day we get 2 Adams, who are both conscious, and who both share the same memories up to the time of duplication. Call the copies A and B. Being A and being B after copying are both consistent continuations of your state at the time of duplication. Having the ability to predict, even in principle, which continuation you experience, is going to violate some other assumption we have made in this reasoning.

This uncertainty is highly general. What if there is a "destructive upload" where one copy is made right now, and the next copy is made in ten years? The uncertainty remains. What if there is no destruction of the original you, but a copy is made anyway? The uncertainty remains, for the reason I gave earlier in the thread: you can consider yourself as being destroyed and reconstituted at every moment anyway, in a digital sense. So you are being cut and pasted at every instant, really.

  On 3/29/2012 at 7:41 PM, Adam Beker said:

What appears most logical to me is that you experience none of them

Well, if you experience none of them, then there's no way you could ever be duplicated in the first place. The beginning assumption was that this was possible.